









New Weaknesses: Despite a major win, 
arbitration decisions in 2014 increase the US’s 
future exposure to litigation and liability 
 
In 2014, the US again 
emerged the winner in 
investor- state 
arbitration. 
Yet despite winning 
the case against it, the 
US lost on several 
important issues. 
Those losses leave the 
US more vulnerable to 
future claims, litigation 
costs, and potential 
liability. 
1. Overview 
The US Trade Representative’s 
office has made a number of 
statements defending its push to 
include investor-state arbitration 
in its investment treaties, 
including the assertion that “[a]s a 
country that plays by the rules 
and respects the rule of law, the 
United States has never lost an 
[investor-state dispute resolution 
(ISDS)] case.” 1  While technically 
true, this glosses over the US’s 
vulnerability, as highlighted by 
several decisions involving the 
US and US treaties in 2014. The 
US did not lose a case, but did 
lose on important issues which 
not only resulted in the US 
having to bear certain costs of 
litigation,2 but which will likely 
have the effect of increasing 
future investment claims 
against the country. Those 
claims, in turn, represent 
potential liabilities that, as cases 
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 have shown, can amount to billions of dollars. 
This year-end review highlights four particular issues on which tribunals decided in favor of the 
investor, and rejected the contrary arguments of the United States. These issues, which arose in 
claims under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), were (1) the meaning of the 
“relating to” jurisdictional test; (2) the meaning of the “treatment” element in particular causes of 
action on the merits; the (3) the scope of the “fair and equitable treatment” (FET) requirement; and (4) 
the ability of the state parties to provide tribunals with their views on issues of treaty interpretation. 
The tribunals’ decisions on these issues resulted in an expanded view of the types of claims that can 
be brought under the NAFTA and minimized the role of the US and its treaty parties in influencing 
and shaping how tribunals interpret investment treaties.  
Finally, this review also highlights a fifth issue in which a tribunal similarly decided in favor of the 
investor in a case against Peru under the US-Peru Free Trade Agreement. The tribunal’s decision on 
this point chips away at the US’s claim that its modern investment treaties provide adequate 
“mechanisms for expedited review of frivolous claims.”3  
2.  Apotex Holdings and Apotex Inc. v. United States4 -- Taking a broad view of the power of the 
tribunal to review trade issues and scrutinize discretionary decisions 
In Apotex Holdings and Apotex Inc. v. United States, the claimants sought over $1 billion in damages5 
from the US after the US Federal Drug Administration (FDA) imposed an “Import Alert” on certain 
generic drugs manufactured in Canada and exported to the US. The “Import Alert” aimed to restrict 
entry and sale into the US market of drugs that were produced by two Apotex family facilities. The 
US imposed the Import Alert after FDA inspections of those two Canadian facilities identified serious 
and systematic non-compliance with good pharmaceutical manufacturing practices. In brief, the 
claimants argued that the “Import Alert” violated the fair and equitable treatment (FET) requirement 
under the NAFTA, and discriminated against them in violation of the NAFTA’s national treatment 
and most-favored nation treatment obligations. 
The “relating to” requirement 
Among its arguments, the US countered that the claimants’ grievances related to treatment of two 
Apotex manufacturing facilities located in Canada (the “Etobicoke” and “Signet” facilities), and not to 
any investments in the US, and were therefore not claims covered by the NAFTA. As emphasized by 
the US, Article 1101 of the NAFTA makes clear that Chapter 11 only applies to “measures adopted or 
maintained by a Party” that “relat[e] to” covered foreign investors or investments in the United 
States. The Apotex claims, the US asserted, did not pass that “relating to” test. 
The meaning of “relating to” in the NAFTA had first been addressed in Methanex v. United States.6 In 
that dispute, all three NAFTA states had made submissions to the tribunal emphasizing that the 





  investment chapter did not provide foreign investors protection against measures that merely 
affected their investments in the US.7 Rather, and as subsequently affirmed by the Methanex tribunal, 
there had to a “legally significant connection” between the measure and an investment in the US, or 
between the measure and the investor with respect to its investment.8  
According to the US, the Apotex tribunal had no jurisdiction over the dispute because the Import 
Alert did not “relate to” or have any “legally significant connection” with Apotex Holdings as an 
“investor” in the country, nor did it “relate to” or have any “legally significant connection” with any 
“investment” in the United States. 
The claimants argued that the Import Alert in fact “relat[ed] to” investments in the US. They 
emphasized that those US investments were (1) certain intellectual property rights in the US (i.e., 
abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs)) directly held by Apotex Inc. and indirectly held by 
Apotex Holdings; and (2) Apotex Corp., a US-based subsidiary of Apotex Holdings that had been set 
up to market and distribute drugs in the US including, in particular though not exclusively, drugs 
produced by other Apotex companies such as the Etobicoke and Signet Canadian manufacturing 
facilities. 
Siding with the US, the tribunal determined that the ANDAs were not “investments” in the US.9 
Consequently, the only 
“investment” at issue in the 
dispute was Apotex Corp., a US-
based marketing and distribution 
subsidiary of Apotex Holdings; 
similarly, the only investor with an 
investment in the US was Apotex 
Holdings. That left the question of 
whether the Import Alert – a 
measure that was taken to control 
imports of adulterated 
pharmaceutical products produced 
in Canadian drug manufacturing 
facilities – was sufficiently 
“relat[ed] to” the relevant investor 
(Apotex Holdings) or its 
investment (Apotex Corp.) in order 
to trigger jurisdiction under the 
investment treaty.   
The tribunal found that it was. Although the disputing parties agreed that the “relating to” 
requirement involved more than an inquiry into the mere effects of a measure,10 it was precisely the 
impacts of the Import Alert on Apotex Corp. that seemed to be the key reason behind the tribunal’s 





determination that the “relating to” requirement had been met. Even though other US-based firms 
were also affected by the Import Alert, and even though Apotex Corp. could have marketed and 
distributed pharmaceutical products from other Apotex and non-Apotex companies (and in fact did 
so), the tribunal considered the Import Alert’s impact on Apotex Corp. to be sizeable and disparate 
enough as compared to other firms to satisfy the “relating to” requirement. According to the tribunal, 
there was no “warrant for interpreting NAFTA Article 1101(1) so narrowly as to require [Apotex 
Corp.] to be the exclusive purchaser of all Apotex Inc.’s products for the USA or Apotex Inc. to be 
[Apotex Corp.’s] sole supplier in the USA.”11 In the tribunal’s view, the fact that Apotex Corp. was 
“by far the enterprise most immediately, most directly and most adversely affected by the Import 
Alert… suffice[d] to satisfy” the “relating to” test.12  
An implication of this holding is that if a manufacturer of goods or services from one NAFTA state 
wants to obtain protections offered under the NAFTA’s investment chapter for treatment of its 
exports, it can do so by establishing an investment in an importing NAFTA state to be the primary 
marketer or distributor of those products.   As the US argued before the tribunal, this blurs the line 
between trade and investment disputes and gives the NAFTA’s investment chapter a broader scope 
than had been intended.13 Post-Apotex, there will thus likely be a rise in companies using their 
“corporate relatives as a kind of Trojan horse” to challenge trade-related measures under the 
NAFTA’s investment chapter.14 
The meaning of “treatment” 
In reaching its conclusion on the meaning of “relating to”, the tribunal showed its reluctance to 
interpret Article 1101 as imposing a strict test on jurisdiction. The jurisdictional phase, the tribunal 
reasoned, was not the place for such an inquiry into the relationship between the measure and the 
covered investor or investment. According to the tribunal, it would be “inappropriate to introduce 
within NAFTA Article 1101(1) a legal test of causation applicable under Chapter Eleven’s substantive 
provisions for the merits of the Claimants’ claims.”15  
The tribunal thus distinguished between jurisdiction and the merits, and indicated that analysis of 
the causal link between the measure and investor or investment would not happen in the former 
phase, but would happen in the latter. Nevertheless, when examining whether the required 
connection between the measure and the covered investor or investment was present for the purpose 
of establishing a violation on the merits, the tribunal did not conduct that additional causal analysis. 
Instead, the tribunal merely reused its jurisdictional “relating to” reasoning. 
Specifically, in its substantive provisions, the treaty has additional language on the required 
relationship between the measure and the investor/investment. Establishing that there has been a 
breach of the national or most-favored nation treatment obligations at issue in the case, for instance, 
requires establishing that there has been (1) discriminatory (2) “treatment” of (3)(a) an investment or 
(3)(b) an investor with respect to its investment. Breach of the FET requirement similarly requires 




In its briefs, the US argued that the Import Alert on the products based on the operations of the 
Canadian facilities did not accord any “treatment” (much less any discriminatory or unfair or 
inequitable treatment) to US-based Apotex Corp., nor did it accord “treatment” to Apotex Holdings 
with respect to its investment in Apotex Corp. Yet rather than explore the meaning of the word 
“treatment” as used in the treaty’s substantive obligations, the tribunal simply referred to and 
incorporated its discussion on the “relating to” requirement.  
According to the tribunal, the fact that the measure was “relat[ed] to” the investor or investment for 
the purposes of the jurisdictional test meant that the measure accorded “treatment” to the 
investment, or the investor with respect to its investment, for the purposes of analysis on the merits.16 
This is notable given that the tribunal’s interpretation of the “relating to” requirement was 
specifically influenced by the provision’s role as a jurisdictional gatekeeper; the tribunal rejected the 
US’s argument that the “relating to” test required analysis of causal links,17 indicating that such 
analysis was better left for the merits phase. Its reliance on the “relating to” test as the basis for 
determining there had been “treatment” thus meant both that that the word “treatment” never 
received independent consideration as an element of the NAFTA’s substantive obligations, and that 
analysis of the causal relationship between the measure and the investor or investment in fact never 
occurred.   
By allowing the investor to pass the “relating to” test on jurisdiction, and then holding that the 
investor had satisfied the “treatment” element on the merits, the tribunal deemed that it had the 
power to scrutinize the US’s decision to impose the Import Alert. Furthermore, in applying that 
scrutiny, it adopted a flexible and wide view of its authority to review the government’s actions. In 
particular, rather than focusing specifically on whether Apotex Corp., the sole investment at issue in 
the dispute, received discriminatory treatment in violation of the national treatment and most-
favored nation treatment obligations, or whether Apotex Holdings had received discriminatory 
treatment with respect to that investment, the tribunal scrutinized facts and arguments regarding 
whether and why the two manufacturing facilities in Canada indirectly owned by Apotex Holdings 
were treated differently by the FDA than manufacturing facilities in the United States (for the 
purpose of the national treatment analysis) or manufacturing facilities located in third countries (for 
the purpose of the most-favored nation treatment analysis). As those two Apotex Canadian 
manufacturing facilities are neither investments in the United States nor investors with investments 
in the United States, it is unclear why the “treatment” accorded to them, even if arbitrary or 
discriminatory, would establish a national or most favored nation treatment claim under the NAFTA. 
The simple fact that a US-based corporate affiliate of the Canadian manufacturers stood to be 
disproportionately affected by the Import Alert appeared to be the sole hook that justified the 
tribunal’s scrutiny of how the US treated those foreign-based companies.  
Through its liberal interpretations of the terms “relating to” and “treatment”, as well as its conflation 
of all of the various members of the Apotex corporate family, the tribunal’s decision signals that the 
NAFTA and other investment treaties provide an avenue for claims that may arise when the products 




products or the processes or production methods through which they are manufactured) and that 
foreign manufacturer or supplier has a corporate affiliate in the host state that is primarily (but not 
necessarily exclusively) responsible for marketing or distributing the affected products.  
Scrutiny of prosecutorial discretion 
In its national treatment and most-favored nation treatment claims, the claimants argued that the US 
violated the treaty’s non-discrimination obligations by imposing the Import Alert on Apotex’s 
products but not taking similarly strong enforcement actions against other drug manufacturers found 
to have comparable problems. The tribunal analyzed evidence on US laws, policies and practices 
regarding regulation of foreign pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities, and then agreed with the 
claimants that the US had in fact treated the Canadian manufacturers less favorably than other 
foreign companies also found to have violated manufacturing standards.  
According to the tribunal, because the claimants had established de facto discrimination, the 
claimants would prevail on their most-favored nation claim unless the US could provide satisfactory 
evidence to establish that it had legitimate reasons for treating Apotex’s Canadian facilities 
differently from other sub-standard performers located overseas.18 The claimants, the tribunal stated, 
were not required to prove discrimination on account of nationality in order to succeed on their 
claims. Rather, the burden of proof shifted on to the US to establish the legitimacy of its actions. If the 
US could not meet that burden, a breach of the treaty would be found.  
Particularly in cases such as the Apotex dispute where rules of privilege, protection of confidential 
business information, and exercises of prosecutorial discretion can make clear explanations difficult 
to produce, this obligation to provide the tribunal with a satisfactorily legitimate reason for treating 
one company differently from another may not be easy for respondent governments to satisfy. 
Ultimately, in Apotex, the tribunal concluded that the US established sufficient evidence that the 
FDA’s actions were “materially influenced by the FDA’s genuine concerns” about public health.19 
While the tribunal did not clearly explain whether or what level of deference it applied to the 
government’s explanations, the tribunal’s willingness to scrutinize the actions of the FDA absent 
evidence of the agency’s bad faith or intentional discrimination, and the tribunal’s use of the 
qualifiers “materially” and “genuine”, suggest a relatively heightened standard of review.  
This stands in notable contrast to the weight of US jurisprudence. Due to the doctrine of separation of 
powers,20 the “discretionary function” exemption to the Federal Tort Claims Act,21 the myriad rules 
addressing judicial review of administrative actions or inactions that are set forth in the 
Administrative Procedure Act and case law interpreting it,22 the deliberative process privilege,23 and 
other laws and doctrines,24 court scrutiny of administrative decisions is carefully governed and often 
highly circumscribed. Nevertheless, when a measure is challenged under an investment treaty, those 
mandatory rules on deference to agency decisionmaking, judicial standards of review, and privilege 




administrative expertise and policy decisions do not apply to arbitral tribunals.25 
Apotex thus signals that companies challenging FDA or other agency enforcement action can 
use the NAFTA to subject government decisions to a different type and level of scrutiny than 
permitted under US law. Moreover, the decision indicates that to establish a violation under 
the national or most-favored nation treatment obligations, the claimant is not required to prove 
nationality-based discrimination. Once a claimant can establish treatment of itself or its 
products that is de facto different from treatment of another company or its products, the 
burden shifts to the government to establish the legitimacy of any different treatment; and the 
tribunal – operating under unclear and not necessarily deferential standards of review – 
becomes the ultimate arbiter of whether the government’s actions were indeed legitimate.  
Fair and equitable treatment of investors? 
Article 1105 of the NAFTA states: 
Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in 
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security.  
In response to the claimants’ arguments that the Import Alert violated that provision, the US 
argued that Article 1105, by its terms, only governs treatment of “investments” (i.e., Apotex 
Corp.). Wrongful treatment of “investors” (i.e., Apotex Inc. or Apotex Holdings) is, according 
to the US, not covered by that treaty provision.26  
The tribunal declined to address that argument; accordingly, the tribunal scrutinized the US 
government’s policies and practices regarding the Import Alert placed on the products 
produced by the Etobicoke and Signet facilities as opposed to more specifically identifying 
whether there was any allegedly wrongful treatment of Apotex Corp., the only covered 
investment at issue in the dispute. Had the tribunal limited itself to considering only the 
treatment accorded to the investment, Apotex Corp, as the US had argued, its inquiry into the 
government’s conduct would have been much more narrowly circumscribed; however, by 
interpreting the provision to include investors -- and therefore, in this case, Apotex Holdings 
and Apotex, Inc., and those companies’ manufacturing facilities in Canada -- the tribunal 
assumed much broader powers to review the government’s conduct. 
By adopting that approach and not ruling on the scope of the FET obligation, the tribunal’s 
decision signals that other companies can similarly seek to use the FET provision to challenge 
actions of the FDA (or other government agencies or branches) that are primarily targeted at 
actors or activities outside of the US. This raises many questions regarding whether and in 
what circumstances tribunals will entertain claims that actions or omissions by US agencies, the 




claims when those government actions or omissions have an effect on the targeted individuals’ 
or entities’ investments in the US.   
 
3.  The power of treaty parties v. the power of the tribunal 
Apotex – The relevance of the treaty parties’ agreement  
In 2001, the NAFTA parties, through their Free Trade Commission (FTC), issued an 
interpretation of Article 1105.27 The FTC interpretation, which is binding on NAFTA tribunals,28 
clarifies that the fair and equitable treatment obligation as used in NAFTA Article 1105 
prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment (MST), and does 
not require any standard of treatment that goes beyond what is required under that MST. In 
order to circumvent that clarification and seek the protections of an arguably higher standard 
of treaty protection, the claimants sought to use the NAFTA’s most-favored nation provision to 
import from the US-Jamaica bilateral investment treaty (BIT) a fair and equitable treatment 
provision that has not been expressly tethered to the MST.  
The US, in response, argued that the most-favored nation obligation cannot be used to alter the 
substantive content of Article 1105 by importing provisions from other treaties.29 It also 
highlighted that the other NAFTA parties shared the same view.30  
Rather than evaluate the NAFTA parties’ positions or the legal significance of agreement 
among the three states on the issue,31 the tribunal proceeded to evaluate the claimants’ claims 
under the US-Jamaica BIT as if the most-favored nation provision could in fact be used to 
import more favorable standards of protection. “[W]hether the NAFTA Parties [were] correct” 
in their interpretation that the most-favored nation provision could not play such a role would, 
according to the tribunal, “have to await the decision of another NAFTA tribunal.”32 The 
tribunal did not give any reasons for declining, itself, to consider the contested issue.  
By adopting this approach, the tribunal left the door conspicuously open for other claimants to 
seek to similarly use the most-favored nation provision to import substantive protections from 
other treaties. If, in contrast, the tribunal had decided that such importation was not permitted, 
the Apotex award would likely have discouraged reliance on those most-favored-nation-based 
arguments in other NAFTA cases. Even though there is no system of binding precedent in 
investment arbitration, an award in one NAFTA case has de facto authority and relevance in 
other NAFTA arbitrations; and the effect of this decision on other disputes, if anything, will be 
to increase efforts to use the most-favored nation provision as an importation tool, and to 
generate future litigation on whether that is allowed.  
Furthermore, by so summarily disregarding the NAFTA parties’ position on whether the most-




failed to give due consideration and legal weight to the ongoing and important roles of states in 
shaping interpretation of the treaties they have concluded.33 By simply punting to another 
tribunal the question of whether the US, Canada and Mexico were “correct” in their 
understanding of the treaty, the tribunal missed an important opportunity to engage with those 
countries and establish additional clarity in NAFTA jurisprudence.34  
In order to avoid other “importation” arguments, the NAFTA parties may wish to again invoke 
the FTC and issue a binding statement on the proper role of the most-favored nation provision.  
Detroit International Bridge Co. (DIBC) v. Canada35 and state-party access to hearings 
In another NAFTA case, DIBC v. Canada, the tribunal appeared to be similarly unmoved by 
state-parties’ interest in shaping interpretation of their treaties, and their special rights under 
international law to do so. In an apparent first in a NAFTA case, the tribunal issued a 
procedural order denying the request of one NAFTA party (the US) to attend hearings in a 
NAFTA dispute against another treaty-party (Canada).36  
Canada had supported the request for the US to attend; DIBC opposed it.37 The US asked the 
tribunal to reconsider its order excluding the government from the DIBC hearings. The US 
emphasized that, under Article 1128 of the NAFTA, non-disputing parties to the treaty have the 
right to make submissions to the tribunal on issues of treaty interpretation. Nothing in Article 
1128, the US further noted, required that the submissions be in writing. The US also argued 
that, in order to ensure the NAFTA parties could effectively exercise their Article 1128 rights 
(whether through oral or written submissions), the non-disputing state parties needed to be 
able to attend hearings in NAFTA disputes to stay abreast of arguments and respond as 
necessary.38 Canada and Mexico likewise made submissions to the tribunal indicating that they 
shared the same interpretation of Article 1128.39  
Despite the NAFTA parties’ agreement on the issue of their treaty rights to attend NAFTA 
hearings, the tribunal did not modify its order. Instead, it simply noted that the non-disputing 
state parties could request access to transcripts of the hearings in order to be able to make future 
written submissions on issues of interpretation.40 The tribunal thus rejected the state parties’ 
contentions that non-disputing states have a right to receive information submitted during 
hearings whether by attending the hearings or obtaining the transcripts, and that they have a 
right under Article 1128 to make oral submissions to the tribunal. In doing so, the tribunal 
showed itself to be unpersuaded by the “basic premise” under international law that “states are 
the masters of their treaties” and have the power to shape the interpretation of those 
instruments through agreement and practice.41 
To avoid future instances in which the tribunal limits the ability of non-disputing state parties 
to attend and make submissions in hearings on issues of interpretation, NAFTA parties may 




tribunals.   
4.  Renco v. Peru and dismissal of meritless claims 
In another decision issued in 2014, the tribunal in Renco v. Peru42 ruled on an issue of first 
impression in the US-Peru Free Trade Agreement (FTA), narrowly interpreting a clause 
providing respondent states an avenue to seek early dismissal of certain claims. Because this 
clause can be found in a number of other treaties concluded by the US such as the US-DR-
CAFTA, the decision in Renco v. Peru may affect the US and other respondent states’ abilities to 
use that early-dismissal mechanism in disputes arising under those agreements. 
The clause, which is contained in Article 10.20.4 of the US-Peru FTA, reads: 
Without prejudice to a tribunal’s authority to address other objections as a preliminary 
question, such as an objection that a dispute is not within the tribunal’s competence, a 
tribunal shall address and decide as a preliminary question any objection by the 
respondent that, as a matter of law, a claim submitted is not a claim for which an award 
in favor of the claimant may be made under Article 10.26. 
The treaty also states that: 
In deciding an objection under [Article 10.20.4], the tribunal shall assume to be true 
claimant’s factual allegations in support of any claim in the notice of arbitration (or any 
amendment thereof) and, in disputes brought under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
the statement of claim referred to in Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The 
tribunal may also consider any relevant facts not in dispute.43 
The US began negotiating for insertion of those clauses after the dispute in Methanex. In that 
case, the US had raised various objections to the claimant’s claims that the US argued could 
have speedily disposed of the case. The tribunal, however, ruled that it did not have the 
authority to decide on those objections as a preliminary matter, and instead postponed their 
resolution to a full decision on the merits and jurisdiction.44 While the US was ultimately 
successful in the case, its victory came only “after three more years of pleading on jurisdiction 
and merits and millions of dollars of additional expense” to the government.45  
In order to avoid similar wastes of time and expense, the US has included Article 10.20.4-type 
provisions in all post-Methanex treaties that the US has concluded. According to the US, this 
provision is similar to what is “used in the U.S. courts to dispose quickly” of frivolous claims.46 
Article 10.20.4 is most frequently analogized47 to Rule 12(b)(6) of the US’s Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which permits defendants to secure early dismissal of all or part of complaints that 
fail “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals can be used, for 




when claims fall outside of the applicable statute of limitations. Similar to the procedure under 
Article 10.20.4, when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts take all facts alleged by the 
plaintiff in its pleadings to be true and determine whether there is “sufficient factual matter” to 
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”48 If no such plausible claim is stated in the 
complaint, the complaint is dismissed on the merits. If a 12(b)(6) motion is denied, the 
defendant can raise the complaint’s alleged failings during other phases of the dispute such as 
in a motion for summary judgment or at trial.  
Motions for early dismissal on other grounds, such as whether the claim is properly before the 
federal court (i.e., whether there is “subject matter jurisdiction”) or whether the court has 
jurisdiction over the defendant (i.e., whether there is “personal jurisdiction”) are governed 
under different rules of procedure, namely Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
In Renco v. Peru, Peru sought to use Article 10.20.4 to seek dismissal of Renco’s claims on 
various grounds: (1) presentation of an invalid waiver; (2) violation of the waiver; (3) lack of 
jurisdiction ratione temporis; (4) violation of the treaty's three-year limitations period; (5) failure 
to state a claim for breach of the investment agreement; and (6) failure to submit two factual 
issues for determination by a technical expert prior to commencement of the arbitration. 
According to Peru, Article 10.20.4 was broad, and could be used to raise objections to the 
tribunal’s “competence” as well as other legal failings of the complaint.  
Renco, in contrast, sought a narrower reading of Article 10.20.4. It argued that objections as to 
“competence” could not be raised under Article 10.20.4’s mechanism and that all of Peru’s 
objections except for one (#5 above) were objections to “competence” that could not be brought 
under Article 10.20.4’s pre-discovery avenue for dismissal. In its submissions, Renco relied on 
the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; according to Renco, Article 10.20.4 was modeled off of 
Rule 12(b)(6) and, just as Rule 12(b)(6) is not used to address objections to “subject matter 
jurisdiction”, Article 10.20.4 is not used to address objections to “competence”.49 
In a non-disputing party submission, the US provided the tribunal with its views on the 
meaning of the contested provision. It agreed with Renco that Article 10.20.4 does not cover 
objections as to “competence”. Nevertheless, the US did not explain what it considered an 
objection as to “competence” to include, nor which, if any, of Peru’s objections were covered by 
Article 10.20.4.  
The tribunal agreed with the US and Renco that Article 10.20.4 does not cover objections to 
“competence”, and explained that it viewed objections to “competence” as including both 
objections to jurisdiction and admissibility. It then determined that none of Peru’s objections 
except its objection that the claimant had failed to “state a claim for breach of the investment 




By determining that all but one of Peru’s objections were “competence” objections not within 
the scope of Article 10.20.4, the tribunal narrowed the provision beyond even the reach of Rule 
12(b)(6). Under US law, for example, a defendant can use Rule 12(b)(6) motions (as opposed to 
Rule 12(b)(1) motions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction) to seek dismissal of claims on the 
ground that they were filed outside of the relevant statute of limitations.50 Peru had argued that 
the claimant’s claims failed in part because they were brought outside of the treaty’s three-year 
limitations period. That argument – a 12(b)(6) argument under US law for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted – was deemed by the tribunal to be a “competence” 
objection falling outside of Article 10.20.4. Similarly, under US law, defendants can use Rule 
12(b)(6) motions for failure to state a claim to seek dismissal of claims when prerequisites to 
filing suit had not been met.51 According to the Renco decision, however, Peru’s request for 
dismissal on the ground that certain prerequisites to suit had not been met were “competence” 
objections that could not be brought under Article 10.20.4. 
Assuming the Renco v. Peru tribunal’s approach to the meaning of “competence” objections is 
followed in other decisions, that early-dismissal provision may be of much less use to 
respondent states than Rule 12(b)(6) (or any other 12(b) motion) is to defendants in US federal 
court proceedings. Similarly, assuming that “competence” objections do, as the Renco tribunal 
concluded, include objections to “jurisdiction” and “admissibility”, that would arguably sweep 
in all objections that the US had tried to raise on a preliminary basis in Methanex, and render 
Article 10.20.4 useless as a tool for seeking speedy resolution of those issues.52 The decision in 
Renco thus raises the question of whether US treaties post-Methanex actually include 
“provisions similar to those used in U.S. courts to dispose quickly of claims a tribunal finds to 
be frivolous.”53  
5.  Conclusion 
As the US has emphasized, it has yet to lose an investor-state arbitration. In 2014, it secured a 
significant victory with its largely successful outcome in Apotex. Nevertheless, it lost on certain 
important issues that will likely be adverse to the US’s interests as a respondent state in future 
cases.  
For one, over the US’s objection, the Apotex tribunal took a broad view of the scope of allowable 
claims under US treaties, signaling that other largely trade-related disputes can be readily 
framed as investment disputes. Additionally, and again over the US’s objection, the tribunal 
adopted a flexible approach to assessing treatment of a corporate family, allowing investment 
law claims to be based on actions targeting foreign companies when those actions have 
disparate impacts on corporate family members in the US. As a result of the Apotex decision, 
the US is likely to face additional trade-related or corporate-family-related claims under the 
NAFTA or other investment treaties, subjecting a greater range of policies, laws and decisions 




Moreover, while Apotex increased the US’s vulnerability to future claims, the decision in Renco 
will limit the grounds on which respondent states can seek and secure speedy dismissal of 
claims that are legally meritless. Together, these 2014 decisions thus broadened the US and its 
treaty parties’ exposure to increased investment arbitration claims and litigation expenses.  
Increased claims and litigation will not necessarily lead to increased liability. Yet, the risk of 
liability rises when, as shown by the Apotex and DIBC tribunals, arbitrators do not feel bound 
to accord adequate weight to input by states on the meaning of their investment treaties. Both 
of those cases revealed tribunals remaining unmoved by the three NAFTA parties’ agreement 
on different issues of interpretation, ignoring the states’ position on the role of the most-
favored nation position and rejecting their arguments on the rights of non-disputing parties to 
make submissions to the tribunal. Those approaches leave state parties in a weak position vis-
à-vis tribunals, with minimal power to shape or anticipate how their own treaties will be 
interpreted. In order for governments to ensure that arbitrators give treaties the meaning that 
the state signatories intend, the US and its treaty parties may need to increase their use of the 
FTC mechanism under the NAFTA or similar mechanisms under other treaties to issue 
interpretations that are binding on tribunals. And in the case of treaties without those 
provisions, the US and its treaty parties are left with little assurance of their ability to influence 
or even predict investment treaty jurisprudence.  
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